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Abstract:  We study the existence of undominated elements of acyclic 
and irreflexive relations.  A sufficient condition for the existence is given in 
the general case without any topological assumptions.  Sufficient conditions 
are  also  given  when  the  relation  in  question  is  defined  on  a  compact 
Hausdorff  space.    We  study  the  existence  of  fixed  points  of  acyclic 
correspondences,  the  existence  of  stable  sets,  and  the  possibility  of 
representing the relation by a real valued function. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Existence of undominated (or maximal) members of acyclic relations has 
interested  economists  for  long.    These  kind  of  relations  appear  e.g.  in 
preference theory (for references, see Alcantud [1]; Bergstrom [2]; Campbell 
and Walker [3]; Walker [4]).  The interpretation of being undominated in such 
applications means that there exists a choice for which there exist no strictly 
better choices.  Since acyclicity seems quite natural in consumer choice theory 
for example, it is clear why such relations interest economists. 
Acyclic relations have applications also in equilibrium theory and in the 
analysis of dynamic systems.  Equilibrium existence results are always some 
kind  of  fixed  point  theorems.  Existence  of  fixed  points  and  existence  of 
undominated members of a relation are closely related problems, so it is not 
surprising  that  results  in  these  areas  would  be  potentially  useful  to 
economists. 
A condition for the existence of undominated members is given in the 
general  case  without  any  topological  assumptions  (Proposition  1).    Such 
conditions  are  also  given  when  the  relation  in  question  is  defined  on  a 
compact  Hausdorff  space.      We  show  e.g.  (Proposition  3)  that  if  a  closed, 
acyclic and irreflexive relation on a compact Hausdorff space has in every 
uncountable closed subset  Z  members that are undominated in Z, then this 
holds actually for every nonempty subset  A, not just for uncountable closed 
subsets.  We have a result about the possibility of representing the relation by 
a real valued function, when each closed subset  Z  has a member that is 
undominated  in  Z    (Proposition  4).    Existence  of  fixed  points  of  acyclic 
correspondences  and  existence  of  Nash  equilibrium  are  also  analyzed   3 
(Propositions 7– 10).  Finally, we have a result about the existence of stable 
sets (Proposition 11). 
The assumptions about relations on topological spaces are formulated in 
such a way, that they seem fit to game theoretical applications.  For example, 
given an element  x  we declare the set of elements that are dominated by  x  
closed.  In applications in preference theory, it may often be more natural to 
declare these sets open (see Alcantud [1]).  Anyway, it is fruitful to analyze 
the  same  problem  (existence  of  undominated  members)  from  different 
perspectives and with different topological assumptions. 
The  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  way.    In  Section  2,  we  give 
examples of situations when undominated members do not exist.   Examples 
are  simple  but  reveal  something  essential  about  what  goes  wrong  when 
undominated members do not exist.  Notation is introduced in Section 3, and 
there  we  give  an  example  of  a  theorem  from  the  existing  literature,  to 
facilitate  comparison  with  our  results.    The  main  results  are  presented  in 
Section 4  and  5.  Section 5  is more application oriented, including the fixed 
point theorems and the result about stable sets. 
 
2.  Examples 
 
Let us give next two examples of acyclic relations in which undominated 
members do not exist.  
 
Example 1.  Let  X  be the boundary of the closed unit ball in the two-
dimensional plane with center at the origin of the plane.  Define a relation  R  
on  X  such that  xRy, if the distance along  X  from  x  to  y  is  1, when we   4 
move from  x  to  y  clockwise.  Since for all  x  there is an  y  such that  xRy, no 
undominated members exist.  Further  R  is acyclic:  there are no points x1,...,xn  
such that  xiRxi+1,  i = 1,..., n – 1, and  x1Rxn.  [You can prove this easily by using 
the fact that  X  has length  2!.]  Clearly, the relation  R  is also irreflexive and 
closed.  In fact, there is a homeomorphism  f : X " X  such that  R  is the graph 
of  f:  y = f(x)  iff  xRy. 
 
So  acyclicity  and  closedness  alone  do  not  guarantee  the  existence  of 
undominated  members,  even  when  the  relation  is  “single  valued”.    But 
maybe the reason is that  X  in Example 1  was not convex?  Consider the 
following example. 
 
Example 2.  Let  X = [0, 1].  Let  a # (1/2, 1)  be irrational.  Let  R  be a 
relation on  X  such that  xRy, if  y = 1 – a + x, when  x $ a, and  xRy, if y = x - a, 
when  a $ x.  Graphically,  R  consists of two disjoint line segments, one above 
the diagonal and the other below.  Then  R  is closed and irreflexive.  Since for 
all  x  there is an  y  such  xRy, no undominated members exist.  R  is also 
acyclic.  To see this, suppose there is a cycle  {x0,...,xn}:  xiRxi+1, i = 0,...,n – 1, and  
x0 = xn.  We may assume w.l.o.g. that the cycle is minimal in the sense that  xi % 
xj  when  i,j < n. Clearly  x0 + ... + xn-1 = x1 + ...  + xn  =df S.  Let  B  be the subset 
of the indices  i < n  such that  xi < a,  M  the subset of the indices  i < n  such 
that  xi = a, and  T  the subset of the indices  i < n such that  a < xi.  Both  B  and  
T  must be nonempty, and denote their cardinalities by  b  and  t.  M  is either 
empty or contains only one member.  Suppose first  M  is empty.  Then  S = 
&i#Bxi + &i#Txi = &i#B(xi + 1 – a) + &i#T(xi - a) = &i#Bxi + b(1 – a) + &i#Txi - ta.  Hence  
b = a(b + t), which is impossible since  t, b > 0  and  a  is irrational.  If  M    5 
contains one element, say    j, that is,  xj = a,  then either  xj+1 = 0  or  xj+1 = 1.  
We get that S = &i#Bxi + &i#Txi + a = &i#B(xi + 1 – a) + xj+1 + &i#T(xi - a) = &i#Bxi + 
b(1 – a) + &i#Txi - ta + xj+1.  Hence  a(b + t) = b + xi+1, a contradiction since  xj+1 = 0  
or  xj+1 = 1. 
 
So convexity of  X  does not guarantee the existence of undominated 
members of  R, although  R  is acyclic, irreflexive and closed.  In fact, we show 
in Proposition 1, that if  X is countable and Hausdorff compact, then there 
exist undominated members if  R   is closed, acyclic and irreflexive.  As a 
countable set, X  cannot be convex.  It cannot even be connected since it is 
Hausdorff and countable.   
Examples 1  and 2  have one common feature.  Starting from any point  x  
in  X, we can construct infinite sequences  {xn},  x0 = x, such that  xnRxn+1  but  
xiRxn+1  does not hold for any  i < n.  We call these kind of sequences irreducible.  
The existence of such irreducible sequences from any initial value  x  in fact 
precludes the possibility that there are undominated members.  We show a 
partial converse in Proposition 1.  Suppose there is some initial value  x  such 
that none of the sequences described above is irreducible.  Then there are 
undominated members, if  R  is acyclic and irreflexive, and if every member is 
in  relation  to  at  most  finitely  many  other  members.    In  this  result,  no 
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3.  Preliminaries 
 
Let  X  be a nonempty set, and  R  a binary relation on X, so  R  is a 
subset of  X ’ X.  The set  X  is called the field of  R.  We may denote  (x, y) # R  
by  xRy  as usual.  A finite subset   {x0,...,xn} ( X  such that  xiRxi+1  for  i = 0,..., 
n-1, is called a path in R.  If it is clear what relation  R  is in question, we may 
simply say that   {x0,...,xn} is a path.   R  is acyclic, if  x0 % xn  for every path  
{x0,...,xn} ( X  containing at least two different members.  R  is irreflexive, if  
xRx  does not hold for any  x.  R  is transitive, if  xRy  and  yRz  imply  xRz, for 
all  x, y, z # X.  The transitive closure of a relation  R, denoted by  R
Tr, is defined 
by  xR
Try  iff there is path  {x0,...,xn}  such that  x = x0  and  y = xn.   
Given a relation on  X and a nonempty subset  Y  of  X, a member  y # Y  
is undominated in  Y, if there is no  y’ # Y  such that  yRy’  and  y % y’.  If y  is 
undominated in  X, we say simply that  y  is undominated.  We may also say in 
this case that  R  has (resp. has not) undominated members.  
An infinite subset  {xn} = {x0,...,xn,...} ( X  such that xiRxi+1,  xi % xi+1, for  i = 
0,  1,  ...,  is  called  a  dominance  sequence.    Note  that  if    R    is  irreflexive,  the 
requirements xi % xi+1  are automatically satisfied.  If  R  is irreflexive and 
acyclic, also  xi % xn  holds for all  i  and  n, i % n,  for any dominance sequence  
{xn}. 
If  R  is a relation on a nonempty set  X, and  Y  is a nonempty subset of  
X, define the restriction of  R  to  Y  by  R|Y = R ) Y ’ Y.  The field of the relation 
R|Y  is  Y.   Then  R|Y  has no undominated members, if and only if  R  has no 
undominated members in  Y.  
Given a nonempty  Y ( X, let  RY = {x # X |  xRy  for some  y # Y}, and  
YR = {x # X |  yRx  for some  y # Y}.  RY  is called the inverse image of  Y, and    7 
YR  is called the image of  Y.  RX  is the domain of  R, and  XR  is the range of  R.  
If  R  is irreflexive, it has undominated members if and only if the domain is 
not  the  whole    X,  and  in  this  case    X  \  RX    is  the  set  of  undominated 
members.  So undominated members of an irreflexive  R  exist precisely when 
the domain of  R  is a proper subset of the field of  R. 
If  X  is a topological space,  R  is  closed  if  R  is a closed subset of the 
product space  X ’ X  which is equipped with the product topology.  The 
following is part of Theorem 4  by Alcantud (see Alcantud [1]  for the whole 
theorem, and related earlier results). 
 
Theorem.  Let  R  be an irreflexive and acyclic relation on  X.  There are 
undominated members, iff  X  has topology such that  X  is compact and  R{x}  is open 
for each  x # X. 
 
It is well-known that if  X  is a compact Hausdorff space and  R  is 
closed, then  YR  and  RY  are closed for any nonempty closed subset  Y  of  X.  
In particular, this holds for singletons  {x}. Further, the correspondence   x " 
{x}R  defined on the domain of  R  is upper semicontinuous in this case.  That is, 
the subset  {x |  {x}R ( O}  is open for any open  O ( X.  Since the function  f : 
X ’ X " X ’ X,  f((x, y)) = (y, x)  is a homeomorphism, the inverse of  R,  R
-1 = 
{(y, x) |  (x, y) # R}  is a closed if  R  is closed  Then the correspondence  y " 
{y}R
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4.  Existence of Undominated Members 
 
In this section a relation  R  on  X  will always be acyclic and irreflexive, 
unless otherwise explicitly stated. 
We will first give conditions for the existence of undominated members 
without topological assumptions. 
Given a relation  R  on a set  X, a dominance sequence  {xn}  is called 
reducible, if there is  m > 0  such that  xiRxm+1 holds for some  i < m.  If a 
dominance sequence is not reducible, then it is irreducible.  Since  R  is acyclic, 
irreducibility means that  xkRxn  if and only if  n = k + 1.   
 
Proposition 1. Let  X  be a nonempty set and  R a nonempty relation on  X  
such that  {x}R  is finite for every  x # X. There exists undominated members in  X, 
iff there exists  x0 # X  such that every dominance sequence starting from  x0  is 
reducible. 
 
Proof.    Necessity.    Suppose    x0    is  undominated.    Then  the  set  of 
dominance  sequences  starting  from    x0    is  empty,  and  therefore  every 
dominance sequence starting from  x0  is reducible. 
Sufficiency.  Suppose no undominated members exists, and let  x0  be 
such that every dominance sequence starting from  x0  is reducible.  Let  T  be 
the tree with root  x0  whose nodes are all paths  {x0,...,xn}  such that  xiRxk  if 
and only if  k = i + 1, where  i = 0,..., n – 1.  If  {xn}  is any dominance sequence 
starting from  x0, then by reducibility there exists a least index   k > 0  such 
that  xiRxk+1  for some  i < k.  Hence all initial segments  {x0,...,xm}  of  {xn}  with   9 
at most  k + 1  members are nodes of  T.  So if there exists a node with  m  
members, then there exist nodes with   k = 1,..,m – 1  members.  
We claim first that there exists a natural number  M  such that all nodes 
of  T  have at most  M  members.  Suppose to the contrary that that for every  
M, there exists a node with more than  M  members.  Then for every  M > 1, 
there exists a node with exactly  M  members.  Now  T  is a finite splitting tree:  
every  node  has  at  most  a  finite  number  of  successor  nodes.    This  follows 
because    {x}R    is  finite  for  every    x  #  X.   Then  it  follows  by  the  König’s 
Lemma, that  T  has an infinite branch.  That means that there is a dominance 
sequence  {xn}  starting from  x0  such that every initial segment  {x0,...,xm}  is a 
node of  T.  But this means  {xn}  is irreducible, a contradiction.  
So every node of  T  has at most  M  members.  The root  x0  has finitely 
many successors because  {x0}R  is finite.  The subtree  T(x)  of  T  whose root is  
x # {x0}R, is such that all its nodes have at most  M – 1  members.  Then it 
follows by induction that  T  has only a finitely many nodes.  Since all nodes 
have only finitely many members, it follows that the subset  Y = {x # X |  x  is 
a member of some node of  T}  is finite.  We show next that if  {x0,...,xm}  is any 
path starting from  x0, then every member of this path is a member of some 
node of  T  as well.   
So let  {x0,...,xm}  be a path starting from  x0.  Let  {x0,...,xk}  be the greatest 
initial segment of this path that is a node of T.  That is,  xiRxn  if and only if   n 
= i + 1, where  i = 0,..,k – 1.  Such a greatest initial segment clearly exists.  
Suppose  k < m, so in particular, the path  {x0,...,xk, xk+1}  is not a node of  T.  Let  
i  be the least index such that  xiRxk+1.  Then the member  xk+1  belongs to the 
node  {x0,...,xi, xk+1}.  If the path  {x0,...,xi, xk+1, xk+2}  is not a node of  T, then this 
happens only because there exists  j $ i  such that  xjRxk+2.  So let  j  be the least   10 
such  index,  and  note  that  then    xk+2    belongs  to  the  node    {x0,...,xj,  xk+2}.  
Continuing in this fashion we get that every member  x  of the path  {x0,...,xm}  
belongs to some node of  T.  Since  {x0,...,xm}  was chosen arbitrarily, it follows 
that the subset  Y = {x # X |  x  is a member of some node of  T}  is the set of all 
members of  X  that belong to some path  {x0,...,xm}  starting from  x0.  
If  y # Y  is dominated, then there exists  y’ # Y  such that  yRy’.  To see 
this, note that if  yRx, then there exists a path starting from  x0  that contains  y  
and ends to  x.  Since  Y  is finite and  R  is acyclic, not all members of  Y  can 
be dominated, a contradiction with the initial assumption that there are no 
undominated members.                                                              Q.E.D.  
 
Now we turn to the case where  X  is a topological space. 
 
Lemma 1.  If  R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact Hausdorff 
space  X  with no undominated members, then there is a minimal nonempty closed  Y 
( X  such that every  y # Y  is dominated in  Y. 
 
Proof.  Partially order by set inclusion the set  C  of all nonempty closed 
subsets  Z  of  X, such that all members of  Z  are dominated in  Z.  C  is 
nonempty, since by assumption  X # C.  Let  T  be a maximal totally ordered 
subset of  C.  Then  T  exists by the Hausdorff Maximality Principle.  Let  Y  be 
the intersection of the members of  T.  Then  Y  is nonempty and closed, since 
every  Z # T  is nonempty and closed and  X  is a compact Hausdorff space. 
Since every  z # Z  is dominated in  Z, we have  Z ( RZ  for all  Z # T.  Choose  
y # Y.  Since  y  is dominated in  Z,  {y}R ) Z  is nonempty and closed for any    11 
Z # T.  Therefore  {y}R ) Y  is nonempty and closed, and  y  is dominated in  
Y.  Since  y  was chosen arbitrarily, we are done.                                Q.E.D.  
 
Recall  that  a  nonempty  closed  subset    Y    of  a  metric  space  is  called 
perfect, if  Y  contains no points that are isolated in  Y, i.e.  there is no  y # Y  
such that for some open neighbourhood  V(y)  of  y,  Y ) V(y) = {y}.  Perfect 
subsets are uncountable.   
 
Lemma 2. Let  R  be a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact Hausdorff 
space  X  with no undominated members, and let  Y ( X  be as in Lemma 1.  Then  Y  
is homeomorphic to a compact perfect metric space, and  Y = R|YY = YR|Y. 
 
Proof.  By Lemma 1, R|Y  has no undominated members, and therefore Y 
= R|YY.  Since  R|Y  is viewed as a relation on  Y, we have YR|Y ( Y.  Let  Z = 
YR|Y, and note that  Z  consists of all those members of  Y  that dominate some 
member of  Y.  Since every  z # Z  is dominated by some  y # Y, we must have  
y # Z.  Since  Y  is minimal and  Z  is closed, we have  Z = YR|Y = Y  by 
Lemma 1.  
Let  {xn} ( Y  be any dominance sequence, i.e.  an infinite sequence such 
that    xiRxi+1,  i  =  0,  1,....    Such  a  sequence  exists,  since    Y    contains  no 
undominated members.  Since  Y  is closed,   cl{xn} ( Y, where  clZ  means the 
closure of a set  Z.  Now  {xn} = cl{xn}   is impossible.  To see this, suppose  {xn} 
= cl{xn}, that is, {xn}  is closed.  Then  {xn}n*1 = {xn} ) {xn}R  would be closed as 
well, since  AR  is closed for any nonempty closed  A ( Y.  By induction, for all 
natural numbers  k, the dominance sequence  {xn}n*k  starting from  xk  would 
be closed.  Since  {xn}n*m ( {xn}n*k  when  m > k, the intersection  )k{xn}n*k  must   12 
be nonempty, because  Y  is a compact Hausdorff space.  Then for some  m,  xm 
# {xn}n*k for all  k, a contradiction with acyclicity.  Therefore  {xn}  is a proper 
subset of  cl{xn}. 
The set  cl{xn}  is a compact Hausdorff space having a countable dense 
subset {xn}.  Urysohn’s metrizability theorem says that the topology of any 
normal  topological  space  with  a  countable  dense  subset  is  metrizable.  
Compact Hausdorff spaces are normal (every pair of disjoint closed subsets 
have disjoint open neighbourhoods), and hence we may view  cl{xn}  as a 
compact metric space. 
Take  any    y  #  cl{xn}  \  {xn}.    There  must  be  a  subsequence    {xn(k)}  
converging to  y, since we may view  cl{xn}  as a compact metric space.  For the 
same reason  the sequence  {xn(k)+1}  has a subsequence converging to  z # cl{xn}. 
Assume w.l.o.g.  that  {xn(k)+1}  converges.  Since  R  is a closed relation, and  
xn(k)Rxn(k)+1, it follows that  yRz.  Hence every member of cl{xn}  is dominated by 
some member of cl{xn}.  Since  cl{xn}  is a subset of  Y, we must have  Y = cl{xn}  
by  minimality  of    Y.    Recall  that    {xn}  (  Y    was  an  arbitrarily  chosen 
dominance sequence.  
If  y # Y  were isolated, we could take a dominance sequence  {xn} ( Y 
such that  yRx0.  Then by acyclicity,  y  couldn’t be a member of  {xn}.  Hence  y  
couldn’t be a member of  cl{xn}, since  y  is isolated.  But then  y + Y  since Y = 
cl{xn}, a contradiction.  Hence  Y  is perfect.                                            Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.  Let  X  be a countable, compact Hausdorff space and  R a 
nonempty and closed relation on  X.  Then every nonempty closed  Z ( X  contains 
members that are undominated in  Z. 
   13 
Proof.  If there were no undominated members in  X, then by Lemma 2  
there would exist a nonempty subset  Y ( X  such that  Y  is homeomorphic to 
a  a  compact  perfect  metric  space.    But  the  cardinality  of  every  nonempty 
perfect set is that of the continuum, a contradiction.   
If  Z ( X  is nonempty and closed, then  R|Z  is a nonempty and closed 
relation on a countable, compact Hausdorff space  Z, and the result follows 
from the first part of this proof.                                                               Q.E.D.        
 
Next  we  drop  the  assumption  that    X    is  countable,  and  give  some 
characterizations for the case that each nonempty closed subset  Z  of  X  has 
members that are undominated in  Z. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact 
Hausdorff space  X.  Each uncountable closed  Z ( X  contains members that are 
undominated  in    Z,  iff  each  nonempty  A  (  X    contains  members  that  are 
undominated in  A. 
 
Proof.  Sufficiency.  If each nonempty  A ( X  contains members that are 
undominated in  A, then this holds for closed nonempty subsets as well. 
Necessity.  The mapping  Z " RZ  (take  Z  and see what members of  X  
the  members  of    Z    dominate)  is  monotone  on  nonempty  subsets  of    X.  
Namely, if  , % Z ( Z’, and  xRz  for z # Z, then  x # RZ.  But since  z # Z’, 
also  x # RZ’, and therefore  RZ ( RZ’. 
Let  X(0) = X, and define  X(n + 1) = RX(n), n * 0.  Then  X(n + 1) ( X(n)  
by monotonicity.  Since each  X(n)  is a closed subset of a compact space  X,   14 
the intersection  Z = )n X(n)  is closed as well, and it is nonempty iff each  
X(n)  is nonempty.  
Suppose indeed that  Z  is nonempty.  If  Z  is uncountable, there is by 
assumption  y # Z  such that  yRy’  does not hold for any  y’ # Z.  If  Z  is 
countable, then also  Z  has a member  y  that is undominated in  Z:  R|Z  is a 
closed (irreflexive and acyclic) relation on  Z, and therefore has undominated 
members by Proposition 2.   
Since  y # X(1), y  cannot be undominated in  X.  Hence  {y}R, the set of 
members that dominate  y, is nonempty and closed by closedness of  R.  Since  
y # X(n + 1)  for every  n, it follows that  {y}R ) X(n)  is nonempty and closed 
for every  n.  But then  {y}R ) Z = )n ({y}R ) X(n))  is a nonempty and closed 
subset of  Z, a contradiction. 
It follows that there exists a natural number  n*  such that  X(n* + 1)  is 
empty but  X(n)  is nonempty for all  n < n* + 1.  That is,  RX(n*)  is empty 
although    X(n*)    is  nonempty  and  closed,  so  members  of    X(n*)    do  not 
dominate anything.  In particular, no member of  X(n*)  dominates another 
member of  X(n*), and hence each  x  in  X(n*)  is undominated in  X(n*). 
Let  S(n) = X(n) \ X(n + 1),  n < n*, and  S(n*) = X(n*).  Then  S(n)  
contains all members of  X(n)  that are undominated in  X(n). Subsets  S(n)  
and  S(m)  are disjoint when  n % m.  The union of all  S(n)’s  is  X, so  {S(n)}  is 
a partition of  X.   
Let  A ( X  be nonempty.  Let  n  be the least index such that  A ) S(n)  is 
nonempty.  Members of this nonempty intersection are undominated in  A.  
Q.E.D.                                                                                   
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We can give an analogous characterization in terms of functions u : X " 
R  (R  is the set of real numbers) that preserve  R  “in one direction”:  xRy  
implies  u(x) < u(y). 
 
Proposition 4. Suppose R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact 
Hausdorff space  X.  Each uncountable closed  Z ( X  contains members that are 
undominated in  Z, iff there is a lower semicontinuous function  u : X " R  with 
finite range such that  xRz  implies  u(x) < u(z)  for all  x, z # X. 
 
Proof.  Necessity.  Suppose each uncountable closed  Z ( X  contains 
members that are undominated in  Z.  Then this holds for every nonempty 
closed  Z  by Proposition 2.  Let  X(0) = X, and define  X(n + 1) = RX(n), n * 0.  
Then  X(n + 1) ( X(n), each  X(n)  is closed, and  X(n)  is nonempty iff  n $ n*  
for some  n*  (see the proof of Prop. 3). 
Let  S(n) = X(n) \ X(n + 1),  n < n*, and  S(n*) = X(n*).  Then  S(n)  
contains all members of  X(n)  that are undominated in  X(n).  Note that since 
each  X(n + 1)  is closed,  n < n*, the union  S(0) - ... - S(n) = X \ X(n + 1)  is 
open, and that subsets  S(n)  and  S(m)  are disjoint when  n % m.  The union of 
all  S(n)’s  is  X, so  {S(n)}  is a partition of  X. 
Define a function  u  on  X  by  u(x) = n* - n, where  n  is the unique 
number such that  x # S(n).  Now  u  represents  R  in the sense that  xRz  
implies    u(x)  <  u(z).    Namely,    u(x)  =  k    iff    x  #  S(n*  -  k).    Since    x    is 
undominated in  X(n* - k),  z # S(n)  implies   n < n* - k.  Hence  u(z) = n* - n > k 
= u(x).  Fix   a # R, and note that  {x # X |  a < u(x)} is open, and so  u  is lower 
semicontinuous.   16 
Sufficiency.  Suppose there is a lower semicontinuous function  u : X " R  
with finite range such that  xRz  implies  u(x) < u(z)  for all  x, z # X.  We may 
assume w.l.o.g. that  u[X] = {0,...,n*}, the set of first  n* + 1  natural numbers.  
Let  T(n) = {x # X |  n - 1 < u(x) $ n}, and note that unions  T(k) - T(k + 1) - ... 
- T(n*)  are open,  k $ n*, and that  {T(n) | 0 $ n $ n*}  is a partition of  X. 
Let  Z  be a nonempty closed subset of  X, and let  k  be the largest 
number such that  Z ) T(k)   is nonempty.  For each  x # Z ) T(k),  u(x) = k, 
and if  xRy  then  u(x) < u(y).  But then  y + Z.  So members of Z ) T(k)  are 
undominated in  Z.                                                                                   Q.E.D.  
 
We will now formulate some sufficient conditions for the existence of 
undominated elements.  In the first, we use the reducibility concept. 
Let  R  a relation on  X.  We say that dominance sequences starting from  
x # X  are uniformly reducible, if there is  M > 0  such that  to each dominance 
sequence  {xn},  x0 = x, there is  n $ M  such that  xiRxn+1  for some  i < n.  
 
 
Proposition 5. Suppose R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact 
Hausdorff space  X.  If every uncountable closed subset  Z ( X  contains a member  z  
such that dominance sequences starting from  z  are uniformly reducible, then  R  has 
undominated members. 
 
Proof.    Suppose    R    has  no  undominated  members.    Then  there  is  a 
minimal closed subset  Y  by Lemma 1  such that every  y # Y  is dominated in  
Y.  By Lemma 2,  Y  is homeomorphic to a compact perfect metric space, and 
so  Y  is uncountable.   17 
Define  {z}R
n  by  ({z}R
n-1)R, when  n > 0  and  {z}R
0 = {z},  z # X.  Then 
each  {z}R
n  is closed, and so are the finite unions of these sets.  By assumption, 
there  is    y0  #  Y    such  that  dominance  sequences  starting  from    y0    are 
uniformly reducible. 
 
Claim.   -n {y0}R
n  is closed. 
 
Proof.  Since the dominance sequences starting from  y0  are uniformly 
reducible, there is  M > 0  such that for every dominance sequence  {yn}  that 
starts from  y0, there is  n $ M  such that  yiRxn+1  and  i < n. 
Let  {xt} ( -n {y0}R
n be a sequence converging to  x, not necessarily a 
dominance sequence.  Since  xt # -n {y0}R
n, there exists a shortest path  {y0,..., 
yk, xt}.  Since  X  contains no undominated members, this path extends to a 
dominance sequence  {yn}  starting from  y0  such that  yk+1 = xt.  Since  {y0,..., yk, 
xt}  is a shortest path from  y0  to  xt = yk+1, we have that  yiRyj  if and only if  j = 
i + 1, when  j $ k + 1.  By uniform reducibility,  k + 1 $ M. 
Therefore  {xt} ( {y0}R - ... - {y0}R
M, which is a closed set, and therefore 
the limit  x  of  {xt}  is in this set also, and so  x # -n {y0}R
n.  End.                                                           
  
Now  y0  is such that  y0  does not dominate any  y # -n {y0}R
n.  By 
Lemma 2  there is  y’ # Y  such that  y0  dominates  y’, so  -n {y0}R
n ) Y  is a 
proper closed subset of  Y.  By Lemma 1, there is  z # -n {y0}R
n ) Y  such that  
z  is undominated in  -n {y0}R
n ) Y.  Since  z # Y,  zRy  holds for some  y # Y, 
and then necessarily y + -n {y0}R
n.  But  y # {z}R ( -n {y0}R
n  by construction, a 
contradiction.                                                                                                Q.E.D. 
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If  X  is a topological space, we say that  A ( X  is sequentially closed, if for 
any sequence  {an} ( A  converging to  a, also  a # A.  Every closed subset is 
sequentially closed.  In metric spaces, sequentially closed sets are closed.   
Recall the definition of the transitive closure  R
Tr  of a relation  R  on  X 
(see Section 3).  Since  R  is acyclic and irreflexive, {x}R
Tr = -n {x}R
n \ {x} for all  
x # X, where  {x}R
0 = {x}  and  {x}R
n+1 = ({x}R
n)R  for  n * 0. 
 
Proposition 6. Suppose R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact 
Hausdorff space  X.  If every uncountable closed subset  Z  of  X  contains some  z  
such that  {z}R
Tr is sequentially closed, then  R  has undominated members. 
 
Proof.  Suppose  there  are  no  undominated  members.  Then  there  is  a 
minimal closed set  Y  by Lemma 1  such that every  y # Y  is dominated in  Y.  
By Lemma 2,  Y  is homeomorphic to a compact perfect metric space, and so  
Y  is uncountable.   
By assumption, {y}R
Tr is sequentially closed for some  y # Y.  Since  Y  
can be viewed as a metric space,  Y ) {y}R
Tr is closed.  Since every member of  
Y  is dominated in  Y, Y ) {y}R
Tr is nonempty.  Since  y  is not a member of  
{y}R
Tr, Y ) {y}R
Tr is a proper closed subset of  Y.  By Lemma 1, there is  z # Y ) 
{y}R
Tr such that  z  is undominated in Y ) {y}R
Tr.  Since  z # Y,  zRx  holds for 
some  x # Y, and then necessarily  x + Y ) {y}R
Tr.  But  x # {z}R ( {y}R
Tr by 
construction, a contradiction.                                                              Q.E.D.                                                                                                
 
Corollary 1. Suppose R  is a nonempty and closed relation on a  compact 
Hausdorff space  X.  R  satisfies the conditions of Prop. 5  or Prop. 6, iff for each 
uncountable closed  Z ( X, there is  z # Z  which is undominated in  Z.   19 
 
Proof.    Necessity.    If    Z    is  countable,  then by  Prop.  1    Z    contains  a 
member  z  such that  z  is undominated in  Z.  If  Z  is uncountable, then 
apply Prop. 5  and  6  to the relation  R|Z  on  Z.  
Sufficiency.  By Prop. 4, there is a function  u : X " R  such that  xRz  
implies  u(x) < u(z)  for all  x, z.  If   {xn} ( X  is a dominance sequence, then the 
image    u[{xn}]    is  infinite.    But  u[X]    is  finite  by  Prop.  4,  so  there  are  no 
dominance sequences.  So the sufficient conditions of Prop. 5  and  6  are 
automatically satisfied.                                                                     Q.E.D. 
 
 
5.  Fixed Points Theorems and Applications 
 
Let  F: X . X  be a correspondence:  for each  x # X,  F(x) ( X.  A 
correspondence  F  is nonempty valued (finite valued), if  F(x)  is nonempty 
(finite) for all  x.  A correspondence  F  is acyclic (irreflexive), if its graph  grF 
= {(x, y) |  y # F(x), x # X}  is acyclic (irreflexive).  We call a correspondence 
reducible, if for some  x0, all dominance sequences in  grF  starting from  x0  are 
reducible.  In other words, if there exists an infinite sequence  {xn}  with first 
member  x0  such that  xi+1 # F(xi), i = 0, 1, ... , then for some  n > 0, there exists  
i < n  such that  xn+1 # F(xi).  If  X  is a topological space, then a correspondence  
F  is closed, if its graph  grF  is closed in the product topology of  X ’ X.   
We say that x # X  is a fixed point of  F: X . X, if   x # F(x).   
 
Proposition 7.  If  X  is a nonempty set, and  F : X . X  is a nonempty and 
finite valued, acyclic and reducible correspondence, then  F  has a fixed point.    20 
 
Proof.  If  F  has no fixed points, then  F  is irreflexive.  By Proposition 1, 
the relation  grF  has then undominated members.  That is, for some  x # X, 
there is no  y # X  such that  (x, y) # grF.  Since  F  is nonempty valued, this is 
impossible.                                                                                                   Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 8.  Suppose  X  is countable, compact Hausdorff space.  If the 
correspondence  F : X . X  is closed, nonempty valued and acyclic correspondence, 
then  F  has a fixed point. 
 
Proof.  Apply Proposition 2  and the proof of Proposition 7.     Q.E.D. 
 
Given a correspondence  F: X . X, let  F
0(x) = {x}, and  F
n(x) = F[F
n-1(x)]  
for  n > 0, for every  x # X. 
 
Proposition  9.    Suppose    X    is  a  compact  Hausdorff  space,  and  the 
correspondence  F : X . X  is closed, nonempty valued and acyclic correspondence. If 
every uncountable closed subset  Z  of  X  contains a member  z  such that  -n>0 F
n(z)  
is sequentially closed, then  F  has a fixed point. 
 
Proof.  Note that  z + -n>0 F
n(z)  since  F  is acyclic.  Apply Proposition 6  
and the proof of Proposition 7.                                                             Q.E.D. 
 
An  n –person normal form game is  G = {S1,...,Sn; u1,...,un}, where  Si  is a 
nonempty set of strategies of player  i = 1,...,n, and  ui  is a real valued utility 
function of player  i = 1,...,n  defined on  S = S1 ’ ... ’ Sn, the set of strategy   21 
profiles.  Given a strategy profile  s  and player  i, denote  s = (si, s-i), where  s-i  
denotes the strategies chosen by  i’s  opponents, and  si  denotes the strategy 
chosen by  i.  A strategy profile  s*  is a Nash equilibrium, if the inequality 
 
ui(s*) * ui((si, s-i*)) 
 
holds for all  i  and all  si # Si.  Let  Bi(s) = {xi | ui((xi, s-i)) * ui((yi, s-i)), for all  
yi # Si}  denote the set of best replies of player  i  against a strategy profile  s # 
S.  For all strategy profiles  s, let  B(s) = B1(s) ’ ... ’ Bn(s), and let  B : S . S  
denote the correspondence that to each  s  assigns the set  B(s).  Then  s*  is a 
Nash equilibrium, if and only if  s* # B(s*).  We say that  B  is the best reply 
correspondence of the game  G.   
 
Proposition 10.  Suppose G = {S1,...,Sn; u1,...,un}  is an  n –person normal 
form game having a best reply correspondence B : S . S.  If  B  is a nonempty and 
finite valued, acyclic and reducible correspondence, then  G  has a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof.  By Proposition 7.                                                                  Q.E.D. 
 
A Nash equilibrium existence result based on Propositions 8 and 9  can 
be formulated analogously.  
In game theoretic applications, dominance sequences are usually called 
best reply sequences.  Acyclicity of a best reply correspondence  B  means that 
there cannot exist cycles in any best reply sequence (or path).  Reducibility of  
B  means that there exists a strategy profile  s  such that if  {s
k}  is a best reply 
sequence starting from  s, then for some  k,  s
k+1  is a best reply not just against    22 
s
k  but also against some other  s
i,  i < k.  Finite valuedness of  B  means simply 
that each player has only a finitely many best replies against every strategy 
profile. 
As a last application, we show that stable sets exist, if a relation has 
undominated members in every nonempty closed subset.  
Given a relation  R  on  X, a nonempty  S ( X  is stable, if  (i)  x, y # S  
implies that neither  xRy  nor  yRx  holds; (ii)  x # X \ S  implies that  xRy  for 
some  y # S. 
 
Proposition 11. Suppose R  is a nonempty, closed, irreflexive and acyclic 
relation on a  compact Hausdorff space  X, and assume that each nonempty closed  Y 
( X  contains a member  y  such that  y  is undominated in  Y.  Then a stable set 
exists. 
 
Proof. Let the subsets  S(n), X(n), n = 0,...., n*,  be defined as in the proof 
of Prop. 3.  So  X(0) = X, and  X(n + 1) = RX(n) ( X(n), and  S(n) = X(n) \ X(n + 
1).  It was shown in the proof of Prop. 3, that every member of  X(n*)  is 
undominated in  X(n*)  and  X(n* + 1)  is empty.  
If  n* = 0, then  S(0) = X  is a stable set.  If  n* > 0, then  S(1)  is nonempty.  
Since members of  S(1)  are undominated in  X(1) = X \ S(0), we have that  
S(1) ( RS(0).  Let  k  be the least index such that  S(k)  is not a subset of  S(0) - 
RS(0).  Let  T(1) = S(0) - (S(k) \ RS(0)).  Then  T(1)  and  RT(1)  are disjoint. If 
their union is  X, then  T(1)  is a stable set.  
Suppose that  T(k)  is defined such that  T(k)  and  RT(k)  are disjoint.  If 
their union is  X  then  T(k)  a stable set.  If their union is not  X, then define  
T(k + 1)  by  T(k + 1) = T(k) - (S(m) \ RT(k)), where  m  is the least index such   23 
that  S(m)  is not a subset of  T(k) - RT(k).  Since there are only  n* + 1  subsets  
S(n), there must exist  k  such that  T(k)  is a stable set.                    Q.E.D. 
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